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The existence of ethnic groups in a society results in the employment of justice systems that are 
uniquely designed to fit the culture of such a people. These systems tend to be informal in nature 
as they apply only to the people in that ethnic grouping. In most cases, they exist within an already 
acknowledged formal justice system. One that is structurally, procedurally and substantively 
different. However, the two systems are similar but not identical. Similar because they purpose to 
achieve justice within a transparent system, but not identical because they employ different 
techniques in order to achieve that justice. 
This paper examines the position of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (TDRMs) in the 
context of criminal matters following the promulgation ofthe Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The 
paper argues that although the traditional systems are lacking in some regards, they act as a 
complementary tool to the formal justice system. 
By interrogating the traditional justice systems m other states, the paper demonstrates that 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are ideal for adjudicating criminal matters in Kenya. 
This is against the background of the backlog of cases in the courts as well as the procedural 
technicalities that have rendered the formal criminal justice system to some extent ineffective. 
The paper suggests that the role of the State is important in order to create a complementary cord 
between the formal and the traditional systems. The ways in which the State can effectuate this are 
explained in the paper. This is removed from the situation oftraditional systems coupled with the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
1.1 Introduction 
"Just because we cannot see clearly the end of the road that is no reason for not setting out on the 
essential journey. On the contrary, great change dominates the world, and unless we move with 
change we will become its victims 1." The journey of this paper; the examination of traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms in the context of criminal matters, will lead us to the end of the 
road; the effective operation ofthese traditional mechanisms in Kenya's criminal justice system. 
The concept of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (TDRMs) has its beginning in the 
formation of groupings in a society that came to be known as communities. The formation of these 
communities is heavily reliant on the characteristics that are similar or common to these 
individuals who form a particular community. Historically, Kenya's communities have taken to 
an ethnic separation. Where the people of a community, for example the Kamba community, speak 
the same language; kikamba. That language acts as the similar or unifying characteristic. 
In Kenya, there are forty two tribes2• Consequently, there are forty two ethnic communities. These 
communities each have their own way of operation. A system, if I may, that allows them to exist 
within themselves. One that preserves their culture while promoting peace and order. An example 
is that of the Meru community. The Meru have a council of elders known as the Njuri Nceke 3. The 
main role of the council is to maintain harmony and facilitate justice4 . They handle a wide array 
of matters such as conducting weddings to adjudicating criminal matters. 
The Njuri Nceke was composed of men. They were elders who were elderly (of old age) and had 
undergone the initiation process of taking an oath; lamala\ and completing three further stages. 
1 Robert F Kennedy Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 November 2004, 1549. 
2 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr old/indigenous/country reports/Country reports Kenya. pdf on 17 October 2015. 
3 The term Njuri Nceke means "a select council" . Kang'ong'oi B, 'Visit to Holy House of the Meru Elders', DAILY 
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This initiation process gave the elders a sense of belonging6. They worked with age groups to 
maintain order in the community. 
The council adjudicated cases where there was harm occasioned against a victim who then sought 
justice against the offender7 • The ultimate aim was to promote reconciliation. Parties could reach 
a settlement on their own, with recourse to the Njuri Nceke only where they disagreed. Other 
communities that had a similar system were the Kokwo of the Pokot8 and the Nabo of the Samburu 
and Marakwet9. 
From this, it is clear that communities in Kenya have a system of governance that the people of 
that community understands and abides by. The systems have certain characteristics that make the 
people trust them. These systems are preferred because they incorruptible, the proceedings and 
language are familiar, they are accessible at all times, affordable and they utilizes local resources 10• 
However, to the society at large, these system have various characteristics that do not conform to 
what society has put as standards of coexistence; the fact that they are patriarchal in nature 11 and 
that some of the practices are repugnant to justice and morality. 
The patriarchal nature ofthese systems emanates from the fact that, like in the Njuri Nceke, only 
men were allowed to be part of the council of elders. Men were given a higher or better position 
than the woman. Some of the practices that were deemed as an affront to justice and morality 
included female genital mutilation. This was the position of the High Court in Katet Nchoe and 
Nalangu Sekut v. R12, where the Court held that the Maasai custom of circumcising females was 
repugnant to justice and morality because the procedure is painful and produces no positive results. 
A repugnant custom is defined under the Constitution ofGhana 13 as those that which dehumanize 
or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a person. Another repugnant practice was 
6 Tribal Law Journal Vol. 10 (2009-2010). 
7 Kinyanjui S. 'Restorative Justice in Traditional Pre-Colonial "Criminal Justice Systems" in Kenya' from 
http://lawschool.unm .edu/tlj/volumes/voi10/Kinyanjui.pdf on 11 August 2015. 
8 Martin K, Rabar B, Pkalya R, Adan M and Masinde I, 'Indigenous Democracy: Traditional Conflict Resolution 
Mechanism among the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet,' /TOE-East Africa, Nairobi, (2004), v-vi. 
9 /bid. 
1° FIDA Kenya, 'Report on traditional justice systems in Kenya : A Study of Communities in Coast Province, Kenya, 10'. 
11 http ://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr old/indigenous/country reports/Country reports Kenya. pdf on 7 October 2015. 
12 Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 2010 consolidated with Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 2010. 
13 Article 26{2) Constitution of Ghana (1992). 
2 
5 Strathmore University 
• LawSchool 
~ 
the fact that women in abusive marriages were expected to return to their husbands despite the 
abuse 14 . 
It is for these two reasons that Kenya has seen three different eras. The first beginning from 
colonialism through to 1967. In this era, traditional (customary) mechanisms were used by the 
council of elders, the African native tribunals and even African courts, and in very specific 
circumstances were the people tried in actual formal courts 15 . The second era commenced in 1967 
running up to 2010. This was as a result of the promulgation of the first Constitution of Kenya in 
1963. Following this promulgation, Parliament enacted two legislation in 1967 to clarify the 
position of customary law. Customary law was limited to matters of land, intestacy, family and 
marriage were left to customary law 16. The Judicature Act went further to explain that customary 
law was limited to civil cases 17. 
The third era established a new dispensation. The promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 
provided redefined the position of customary law. Article 159 (2) states that "In exercising judicial 
authority, the courts and tribunals shall be guided by the following principles- .. . (c) alternative 
forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms shall be promoted, subject to clause (3) . Clause 3 explains that the use of 
these TDRMs shall not contravene the Bill of Rights, be repugnant to justice and morality or be 
inconsistent with this Constitution or any written law 18. 
This Article permits courts and tribunals to apply TDRMs without placing any constraints. There 
is no mention of whether they should be applied to only civil matters. This can easily be construed 
that TDRMs can also be used in the adjudication of criminal matters. This is the position that the 
courts have recently taken to. In Republic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed19, a murder case, the court 
14 FIDA Kenya, 'Report on traditional justice systems in Kenya, 10'. 
15 Kariuki, F, 'Customary Law Jurisprudence from Kenyan Courts: Implications for Traditional Justice Systems' from 
http://www.strathmore.edu/sdrc/uploads/documents/books-and-articles/TDRM%20and%20Jurisprudence.pdf on 
12 July 2015. 
16 Section 2, Magistrate Courts Act (1967). 
17 Section 3(2), Judicature Act (No. 16 of 1967). 
18 Article 159(3), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 




accepted a settlement of the payment of camels, goats, and performed rituals to the family of the 
deceased. The rituals were a form of blood money to the deceased family. 
Although courts have taken to TDRMs in criminal matters, there are a few challenges that come 
with it. The first being the aim ofthese two systems; the formal and the informal justice systems. 
The aim of many formal criminal justice systems is deterrence with the end being retributive 
justice. On the other hand, TDRMs seek to employ reconciliation mechanisms with an end to 
restorative justice20 . The second challenge lies in the enforcement of punishment. Disputes 
adjudicated at the community level tend to lean on material compensation21 , but formal systems 
have a wider variety of punishments intended to fit the crime. 
Based on the historical undertones of the people of Kenya, this paper contends that traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms are a more effective means by which people at the grassroots level 
can access criminal justice. This means that both the formal and traditional systems must have an 
equal understanding of the severity of certain crimes, which will translate to punishments of similar 
degree, resulting in a similar if not identical form of justice. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
A legal system, whether formal or informal, exists to achieve justice among other things. The 
achievement of this justice is reliant on the establishment of such a right; the right to justice. This 
right is important especially for the victims of crimes committed. They know that if a crime is 
committed, they can and should get justice. This right is enshrined in the Constitution ofKenya as 
the right of access to justice where "The State shall ensure access to justice for all persons and, if 
any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not impede access to justice. "22 
20 http://www.cscsb.org/restorative justice/retribution vs restoration .html on 4 April 2015 . 
21 https://www .griffith .ed u. au/ data/assets/pdf file/0020/2204 75/Repa ration-and-restoration-as-of-1-Feb-
201l.pdf on 18 November 2015. 





Access to justice is defined in the case of D1y Associates Limited v Capital Markets Authority & 
anor23 . The court was of the view that, access to justice includes the enshrinement of rights in the 
law; awareness of and understanding of the law; access to information; equality in the protection 
of rights; access to justice systems particularly the formal adjudicatory processes; availability of 
physical legal infrastructure; affordability of legal services; provision of a conducive environment 
within the judicial system; expeditious disposal of cases and enforcement of judicial decisions 
without delay. 24 
Traditional justice systems are a means of promoting this right. They are an effective means of 
achieving justice at the grassroots level. Their dynamic nature indicates that they are capable of 
changing in order to conform to a set standard or rules25 . The problem tackled by this paper is that 
legal pluralism can render one system ineffective where the existing systems are largely different 
instead of complementary. Thus, this paper investigates the suitability of TDRMs in Kenya in a 
bid to establish that different justice systems can exist in a manner that maximizes their ability to 
support and enrich each other, rather than to undermine and conflict with each other. 
1.3 Justification of the Study 
The new dispensation that was created by the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 20 I 0 
gave rights to two criminal justice systems. The already existing formal courts, and now, the 
traditional mechanisms26 . This means that the two must find a way to coexist in complementarity 
and the courts are given the mandate to use them where necessary. This is seen in the case of R v. 
Lenaas Lenchura27, where Emukule J resorted to sentencing a man convicted of murder within the 
context ofSamburu customary law because ofthe specific facts ofthat case. 
23 Nairobi Petition No. 358 of 2011, (Unreported). 
24 Ibid 
25 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr old/indigenous/country reports/Country reports Kenya. pdf on 17 October 2015. 
26 Article 159(2) & (3), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 





Consequently, this study evaluates the suitability ofTDRMs by illuminating upon the aspects of 
the formal justice system that can be used to strengthen and make them complementary. It further 
acts as a reference piece for policy makers within the Judiciary and as a guide to the courts and the 
public, concerning the position of TDRMs in criminal matters. Finally, the study proposes how 
TDRMs can work to meet the aims of penal laws through legislative and non-legislative options 
in a way that which will translate to punishments of similar degree, resulting in a similar if not 
identical form of justice. 
1.4 Statement of Objectives 
Against this background, the main objective ofthis study is to assess the suitability ofTDRMs in 
Kenya in the adjudication of criminal matters by-: 
1. Evaluating the characteristics and operation of traditional justice systems; 
2. Examining how dual legitimacy functions when formal and informal justice systems 
interact; 
3. Interrogating the effect of legislation and excessive State interference on TDRMs; and 
4. Exploring whether the of use non-legislative actions strengthens TDRMs. 
1.5 Research Question 
This paper seeks to evaluate the suitability ofTDRMs in adjudicating criminal matters in Kenya. 
In an attempt to critique the re-emergence of this practice, the following questions shall be 
answered-: 
1. Can traditional mechanisms can be effective without the involvement ofthe State? 
2. How the courts have taken to this re-introduction ofTDRMs? 
3. How can the weaknesses of one system be complemented by the strengths of another? and 
4. Are there legislative and non-legislative mechanisms that can be employed by the courts 






1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The suitability of TDRMs can be interrogated from many viewpoints . This paper is limited to 
critiquing the strengths and weaknesses of TDRMs when pitted against the formal courts. The 
paper then examines the legal framework within which the criminal justice system of Kenya 
functions following the re-introduction and the recent use ofTDRMs to achieve criminal justice 
in Kenya. A comparative analysis is made against the Gacaca courts in Rwanda and the traditional 
systems in Pakistan, with a deeper focus on the ways in which this informal system can 
complement the courts. 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
This paper is divided into five parts. Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the topic of study of the 
dissertation. Chapter 2 discusses the theories of legal pluralism and illuminates on the theoretical 
framework and methodology upon which the study is premised. Chapter 3 explores the legal 
framework within which TDRMs function. Chapter 4 lays out some fallacies, challenges and 
opportunities created by TDRMs in the realm of criminal justice. Chapter 5 engages in a 
comparative analysis with Rwanda and Ethiopia, fellow East African countries, on the application 
of TDRMs in a formal criminal justice system. Chapter 6 proposes ways of countering the 
deficiencies of TDRMs and makes recommendations on the reforms necessary so as to cause a 





CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The suitability of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms can be analysed from the concepts of 
crime and criminal justice. Within these concepts, there are two theories that undergird a criminal 
justice system; the theory of legal pluralism28 and the classical theory of crime29 . 
The theory of legal pluralism seeks to explain one thing. That there can be more than one legal 
orders in a society, and these legal orders can coexist in different capacities 30 . In this paper, the 
two legal orders are the formal (courts) and the informal (TDRMs). Moore31 defines plural 
(meaning multiple) legal systems as semi-autonomous social fields with rule-making capacities, 
and the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix 
which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it, 
sometimes at its own instance' 32 . 
This definition posits two things. Firstly, that informal systems exist as semi-autonomous social 
fields, and that they have a means to induce compliance; such as the council of elders in certain 
communities. Secondly, that they are set in a larger social matrix; the judiciary, which may 
interfere either on the request of a community or on its own volition. This is a form of pluralism 
known as weak legal pluralism. The proponents of weak legal pluralism identify a dominant legal 
order (formal courts) and subsidiaries (TDRMs) . These subsidiaries are considered to have 
subsumed to the dominant one33 . This is the case because the formal will dictate the informal in 
certain regards i.e. ensuring that TDRMs are not repugnant to justice and morality34 . 
28 Moore S.F, 'Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study', Law as 
Process: An anthropological approach, 1978. 
29 Beccaria, C. 'On Crimes and Punishment', New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. 
30 Rouland N, 'Legal anthropology', Stanford University Press (1994), 51. 
31Moore S.F, 'Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study', Law as 
Process: An anthropological approach, 1978, 56. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bernstein H, Memorial Lecture, "Normative And Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective William Twining Lecture In 
International And Comparative Law" Duke University School Of Law April 7, 2009 . 






In Kenya, the dominant criminal legal order is the courts system. They are considered formal 
because their structure is laid out within the Constitution35 . The structure runs from the Supreme 
Court to the Court of Appeal to the High Court up to the subordinate courts. These courts operate 
within the limits of the Bill ofRights36, the Penal Code37 and the Criminal Procedure Code38 . These 
three have acted as the rules of thumb when punishing crimes. They prescribe the laws, the rules 
and the standards to which the courts should adhere to when adjudicating crimes. 
Traditional systems, on the other hand, do not prescribe to any documented rules 39 . The customs 
of the people dictate the rules, the laws and even the standards to which the "traditional 
adjudicators" adhere to . By acknowledging TDRMs as a means of resolving disputes, the 
Constitution of Kenya introduced the theory of legal pluralism, specifically weak legal pluralism. 
Where the courts shall be the determinants ofwhen to use TDRMs subject to the boundaries of 
justice and morality, the Bill ofRights40 and the supremacy ofthe Constitution41 . 
TDRMs exist in a plethora of normative orders, whose hierarchy, although established by the 
Grundnorm (the Constitution), recognize that there are other regulatory and normative orders other 
than formal law that affect people's lives. As a result, village courts in Agarabi, Papua New Guinea 
have generated their own set ofrules and procedures, as have other village courts42 . Westermark43 
therefore insists we must not be blind to what Levi-Strauss describes as bricolage: 'people's 
capacity to select bits and pieces ofthe system's intellectuals to build and recombine them for their 
own purposes in their own way. ' 44 
35 Article 162, Ibid. 
36 Chapter 4, Constitution of Kenya {2010) . 
37 Chapter 63 of the Laws of Kenya. 
38 Chapter 75, Ibid. 
39 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr old/indigenous/country reports/Country reports Kenya. pdf on 23 October 2015. 
40 Article 159 {3), Constitution of Kenya {2010) . 
41 Article 2, Ibid. 
42 http://commission-on-legal-pluralism .com/volumes/19/huber-art.pdf on 30 October 2015. 





The acknowldegment ofTDRMs in the Kenyan criminal system is an attempt by the law to better 
accommodate the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous people45 . However, the challenge posed is 
that variants of an existing criminal justice system must be complementary to avoid rendering the 
system ineffective in itself. Therefore, the procedural may be different but the substantive must be 
similar if not exactly the same. Therefore, although the traditional systems and the courts are 
autonomous legal orders, since the two will be used at different instances, there must be an 
established system of compimentarity to avoid a spill into either the courts or the traditional 
mechanisms. 
The second theory that undergirds this paper is the Classical theory of crime. This theory is based 
on the premise that crimes are committed through free will, and as a result, the punishment should 
be just and proportionate to the crime46 . The position of the state in punishing crime is embedded 
in society's right to punish crime. This right is then transferred to the state. 
The existence of variants in a criminal justice system demand the aspect of complementarity to 
achieve a common end. According to Cesare Beccaria47, "For a punishment to attain its end, the 
evil which it inflicts has only to exceed the advantages derivable from the crime. "48 This means 
that any punishment awarded should neither be excessive nor modest; it should fit the crime. To 
ensure this principle is observed, the persecution of criminal matters should be public. Thus, the 
position ofthe state is mandatory. 
A criminal justice system must adhere to a threefold criteria:-
I. It must explain the causation of crime and criminal behaviour; 
2. It must suggest punishment and preventive measures to suit its ideology; and 
3. It must encompass the diversity of its people. 
45 Svesson T, 'lnterlegality, a process for strengthening indigenous peoples' autonomy: the case of the Sami in 
Norway', Journal of Legal Pluralism, vol. 51 (2005), 74. 
46 http://cjonline.uc.edu/resources/news/criminology-schools-of-thought/ on 12 November, 2015. 







Thus, whether there are formal and informal variants, they must subscribe to this criteria to achieve 
the rationale behind the existence ofthe system; to prevent crime through deterrence. Deterrence 
seeks to make a potential criminal decide against committing a crime, as the punishment would be 
too costly. This means that both the formal and traditional systems must have an equal 
understanding of the severity of certain crimes, which will translate to punishments of similar 
degree. 
The challenge is that traditional justice systems proffer restorative justice with the aim of 
promoting social cohesiveness, peace and social justice. Thus, their punishments inclined to 
material compensation. The courts have a wider array of punishments that range from 
imprisonment to payment of fines because their main aim is deterrence. 
In the Mohammed Abdow case49, although the shackles of formality are broken, the use of animals 
as a punishment for murder does not fit the severity of the effects of murder. The assumptions 
applicable, for the purpose of this paper, include50 :-
a) that punishment is necessary to deter crime and the state has the prerogative to administer 
it; 
b) that punishment should fit the crime; 
c) that use ofthe law should be limited and due process rights should be observed; and 
d) that each individual is responsible for his or her actions. 
The classical school of thought illuminates that it is necessary to distinguish that there are various 
types of crime; misdemeanours versus felonies 51 , and crimes against property versus against the 
person versus against the state52 . Ideally, it is almost impossible to have "equal justice" in an 
unequal society, so the burden falls upon the state to ensure that the variants of the criminal justice 
system, although different, minimize the possible injustices; both to the society and the aggrieved. 
49 [2013] eKLR. 
50 Taylor I, Walton P, and Young J, 'The New Criminology', London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 2. 
51 Cap 75. 
52 https://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/law-school/docs/Crimes Against Persons Property - 2010.pdf 





The role of the state is to act as an autonomous unit and against the interests of the party with the 
upper hand, which in most cases has proven to be the upper class community. However, the 
constitution has introduced a new upper hand ; that of the criminal. By allowing the Mohammed 
Abdow53 case to be settled in such a manner, the state has given criminals another way out. One 
that they themselves can determine, should it be more lucrative to the aggrieved party, at the 
expense of justice to the society. In that case, the society was not protected from the possibilities 
of future murders as he was not detained. 
From this, it is clear that there needs to be a deeper interaction between the formal and traditional 
criminal systems. The pitfalls TRDMs when examined through the lens ofthe classical school of 
thought include a lack of enquiry into the disabilities that can cause the commission of a crime i.e. 
insanity, drunkenness inter alia; as well as the lack of proper distinction between crimes, thus the 
application of less than fitting punishments. 
2.2 Research Methodology 
This paper evaluates suitability oftraditional dispute resolution mechanisms to criminal matters in 
Kenya form a theoretical perspective. The paper subscribes to the Doctrinal Research 
Methodology'4 . This methodology interrogates legal doctrines through analysis of statutory 
provisions and cases by the application of power of reasoning. It gives emphasis on analysis of 
legal rules, principles or doctrines55 . This paper examines the relationship between TDRMs and 
the court system, with reference to criminal matters. It explores the limitations presented by 
TDRMs and examines the existing resource materials, including past related research reports. 
This paper relies on both primary and secondary sources of information. The primary sources 
include the Constitution, statutes, case law and conventions; while the secondary sources would 
include journals, articles, books, newspapers, and other relevant materials from the internet. 
53 [2013) eKLR. 






The secondary information sources are critically perused to determine their usefulness and 
relevance. Thereafter, the study also examines and undertakes a content analysis of decided cases, 






that is anchored on the law. This is because a crime cannot be termed as such if it is not deemed 
to be a crime in the law. 
The chapter will conclude with a look at decided cases in Kenya, with the aim of establishing what 
the stance of the court is with regard to the use ofTDRMs in criminal matters. 
3.1 The Parties 
There are three parties to a criminal matter. The victim of the crime, the perpetrator ofthe crime, 
and the adjudicator63 . Being the protecor of the society, the State is conferred upon the right to 
prosecute crime by the society and takes the role of the aggrieved. The State retains this position 
in the formal justice through the office of the Director of Public Prosceution (DPP)64 . The 
adjudicator is the magistrate or judge. The perpetrator is the accused. 
Traditional justice systems oust the State and the aggrieved party retains their role 65 . The 
adjudicators are the "traditional judges" i.e. the the council of elders. The perpetrator remains the 
accused. The question then becomes, when the State is ousted as a party, does the case then become 
civil in nature? If so, does this not water down the criminal justice system? If not, how can the 
matter retain its criminality? 
A criminal matter can retain its criminality even when the State is not a party. From the earlier 
explanation, an aggrieved indivudual has the right to prosecute a matter. This right is then 
transferred to the State. In traditional justice systems, the aggrieved keeps this right. The only 
difference comes in at the adjudication level. Judges and magistrates in the formal system are duly 
trained in the matters of the law. The traditional judges adjudicate based on customary practices. 
However, the criminal nature ofthe matter is retained according to the customs of the people. 
63 Ashworth A and Harder J, 'Principles of Criminal Law', 2013. 
64 Article 157(6) (a) Constitution of Kenya (2010). 






3.2 The Justice Systems 
A justice system exists to realize a certain form of justice. This can be seen from the structures of 
dispute resolution as well as the types of punishments that are affordered by these systems. Most 
formal justice systems seek retributive justice, while community justice systems lean towards 
restorative justice66 . Retributive justice focuses on the offender. It takes the "give me what I 
deserve" approach. Therefore, if I have killed someone, my life should also be taken away. That 
is why the death penalty exists as a punishment to murder67 . Restorative justice focuses on the 
community as a whole. It encompasses the need for the victim to be compensated, couples with a 
reconciliation between them and the offendor upon confession. That is why compensation is 
mandatory regardless of the nature ofthe crime. 
Where variants of a criminal justice system exist, there is bound to be an overlap. The differences 
in the systems will create a vaccum, which if not filled, will render the system inoperable. The 
challenge, however, is posited to the State. By acknowledging a variant of its system, it has the 
obligation to ensure this variant is complemenatry and not conflicting. The community justice 
system is inquisitorial and restorative in nature while the Common Law system is adversarial and 
punitive68 . This difference gives an upper hand to the criminal. They can, in some circumstances, 
dictate which system to use. This may not be a problem when misdemeanours are propagated; it 
will be a challenge when felonies are committed. On the other hand, they facilitate access to justice 
for those at the grassroots level, and also the poor and disenfranchised. 
In reality, a balance must be struck so that the strengths of the formal justice system complement 
the weaknesses of the TJS, and vice versa. The structure of the formal criminal justice system is 
such that there procedures to be followed in order for justice to be achieved. They begin from the 
reporting ofthe crime, to one's arraignment in court up until the stage where one is either dismissed 
or convicted and consequently punished69 . This structure also caters for other matters; issues 
66 Wachira G, 'Vindicating Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights in Kenya' Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 
2008. 
67 Section 204, Cap 75. 
68 http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/features/73087 accessed on 7 Apri/2015. 






surrounding evidence70, the use of qualified legal defenders, and also proffer alternative means of 
dealing with perpetrators who have any form of disability i.e. insanity. 
In contrast, traditional justice systems have a trial format based on the guidelines provided by the 
''traditional judges"71 . They lack a legal guide that can cater to issues surrounding evidence, the 
recording ofthe proceedings as well as offering different forms of punishment. 
From this, it is clear that traditional justice systems need a touch of legal guidelines in order to 
make them more capable of handling certain components i.e. the legal components that come into 
play where evidence, specifically electronic evidence is concerned. 
3.3 Punishment 
A criminal justice system has the following reasons to punish offenders 72 : retribution, restitution, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence73 . The punishments afforded by courts show that they have taken to 
retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence74, while the reconciliatory nature of traditional systems 
shows a preference for restoration75 . In the Mohammed Abdow76 case, had the case proceeded in 
court, the penalty afforded would be have been death77 . However, precedent has shown the 
predicament to be life imprisonment. 
In the Abdow78 case, the family of the deceased were compensated with camels, goats, and 
performed rituals. The rituals were a form of blood money to the deceased family. This form of 
monetary compensation is seen in many communities such as the Akamba, the Samburu and even 
the Kalenjin 79 . This poses a challenge to the courts. Can material compensation be used to deter 
7° Cap 80. 
71 Wachira G, 'Vindicating Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights in Kenya', 2008. 
72 http://www.csun . edu/~dgw61315/aboutlaw.htmi#Footnotes on 1 April 2015. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ashworth A and Harder J, 'Principles of Criminal Law', 2013. 
75 Wachira G, 'Vindicating Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights in Kenya', 2008. 
76 [2013) eKLR. 
77 Sections 203 & 204 Cap 63. 
78 [2013) eKLR. 







crime? It is the duty of the State to protect society from crime and even more, obliterate any 
opportunities that may allow for repeat offenders. 
Where crimes such as murder, rape, and even vio fence upon the person are committed, can material 
compensation deter these perpetrators from repeating the same crimes? Take the Abdovl0 case for 
instance. Is it safe to say that potential murderers have been deterred? 
From this, it is clear that two things must happen . Firstly, that the State must categorize crime, and 
secondly, that punishments of equal weight must be awarded for these crimes. This means that 
both the formal and traditional systems must have an equal understanding of the severity of certain 
crimes, which will translate to punishments of similar degree, resulting in a similar if not identical 
goal i.e. deterrence. 
3.4 Decided Cases 
The promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya led to a departure in the courts against the strict 
implementation of the Penal Code in adjudicating criminal matters. In the case of Githere v 
Kimungu 81, Justice Hancox opined that: "the relation of rules of practice to the administration of 
justice is intended to be that of a handmaiden rather than a mistress and that the Court should 
not be too far bound and tied by the rules, which are intended as general rules of procedure, as to 
be compelled to do that which will cause injustice in a particular case". 
The court was of the same view in Ndeto Kimomo v Kavoi Musumba82 . Law V.P stated as follows, 
"In my view, when the parties agreed to have their case decided by taking of an oath, they were in 
effect withdrawing the appeal ji-om the High Court "s jurisdiction and invoking another 
jurisdiction, involving procedures such as slaughtering a goat, beyond the control of the High 
80 [2013] eKLR. 
81 (1976-1985) EA 101. 





Court. The parties were of course entitled to have their case decided in any lawful way they wished, 
by consent. " 
The existence of traditional systems allow parties to seek recourse for a crime outs ide the courts if 
they so wish. These cases explain that the court should not be strict on the existing formal law. 
This forms the basis upon which the cases below are discussed. 
In R v. Lenaas Lenchura83, a dispute arose at a trading centre in Lerata between the accused, aged 
89, and Lotiyan Lekapana, aged 55, over who would fetch water first. In the course of their dispute, 
the accused stabbed Lotiyan to death. This was a clear cut case of murder. The prosecution argued 
that the accused was a first offender and that the special circumstances of the case; the scarcity of 
water in Samburu, should be considered. The judge applied the customary laws of the accused due 
to his advanced age and the failure to provide water in that area by the government. The accused 
was convicted of manslaughter. He was sentenced to five years suspended sentence and was 
required to compensate the family of the deceased with one female camel according to their 
customs. 84 
The case of Stephen Kipruto Cheboi & 2 others v R85 . The case involved five brothers convicted 
of assaulting three persons. The conviction oftwo ofthe appellants was quashed on the basis that 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms were applicable to misdemeanours. The other 3 were 
convicted under a felony. They appealed arguing that they were part of an amicable resolution 
aimed at voluntarily enhancing family cohesion and reconciliation. This amicable resolution 
emanated from a reconciliation meeting which was attended by 89 persons from Nerkwo-Katee 
village. One of the complainants filed an affidavit and asked the court to quash convictions. The 
court did not accept this affidavit and upheld the conviction 86 . 
83 Criminal Case No. 19 of 2011. 
84 /bid. 






The cases of Lenaas Lenchura87 and Stephen Kebol8 illuminate on the stance of using TDRMs to 
adjudicate criminal matters. In one case, the facts of the case were so special that the court 
permitted the use ofTDRMs despite the severity ofthe crime. In the other, the court was keen on 
enforcing deterrence and retribution. The existence of both variants reg uires a more defined 
approach with regards to which categories of crimes can be tried by traditional systems. 
In Zimbabwe89, the Customary and Local Courts determine in which system a case will be decided. 
It is based on the mode of life of the parties, subject matter ofthe case, the understanding by the 
parties of the provisions of customary law of Zimbabwe and the relative closeness of the case and 
the parties to customary law or the general law of Zimbabwe90 . 
In Swaziland customary courts have jurisdiction both in criminal and civil matters over Swazi 
nationals residing within their jurisdictional areas91 . However, at a practical level whether a 
criminal case is to be tried by a traditional or formal court is made at a police station92 . The burden 
is therefore placed on the State to ensure that traditional systems can adjudicate criminal matters 
of all kinds, with the exceptions i.e., crimes against the State, clearly stipulated. 
There are two ways in which the State can classify crime-: 
a) Misdemeanours and felonies 93 . Misdemeanours should in most cases be dealt with by the 
traditional mechanisms. Felonies must be determined on a case to case basis to prevent the 
law from aiding in the propagation of any form of injustice. 
b) Crimes against the person (body), against the State and against property94 . Crimes against 
the person such as rape and murder should be tried by the courts. Compensation in the form 
87 Criminal Case No. 19 of 2011. 
88 [2014] eKLR. 
89 Chirawu S, "Challenges to Outlawing Harmful Cultural Practices for Zimbabwean Women," in Women, Custom 
and Access to Justice, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Perspectives-Political Analyses and Commentary (2013), 15-17. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Masuku T, "Women and Justice in Swaziland: Has the Promise of the Constitution been Fulfilled?" in in Women, 
Custom and Access to Justice, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Perspectives-Political Analyses and Commentary (2013). 
92 /bid. 
93 Cap 75. 
94 https://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/law-school/docs/Crimes Against Persons Property - 2010.pdf 





of animals may not be the appropriate punishment. Using TDRMs will not deter such 
perpetrators. Crimes against property such as burglary and robbery can be handled by 
TDRMs, to the extent that they are not couples with crimes against the person i.e. robbery 
with violence. Crimes against the State i.e. treason cannot be tried at the grassroots level 
because they are a special class of crimes. 
Kenya has a proper legal framework that can be melted into the traditional justice systems. 
Therefore, the threshold ofthese crimes should be that established in the Penal Code; where crimes 
that accrue a jail term up to 7 years can be dealt with TDRMs. The burden rests on the State to 






CHAPTER 4: FALLACIES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Despite its use, customary law is an uncodified source of law entrenched in tradition95 . As such, it 
has to be proved through expert witnesses, literature and past court decisions 96 . By examining the 
nature of traditional systems, we can derive its strengths and weaknesses in order to arrive at the 
challenges and opportunities they create against the fallacies that surround them. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Kenya encountered three eras where the position of customary law has 
always changed. This chapter will focus on the second era; between 1967 and 2010, where the first 
TDRMs and customary law were limited to matters of land, intestacy, family and marriage were 
left to customary law97 • This period will highlight the positive and negative connotations of 
traditional justice systems. 
4.1 Positive Attributes 
Traditional justice systems have operated effectively within communities because oftheir dynamic 
and informal nature which has been informed by certain characteristics. These are98 -: 
a) Accessibility, speed, and a.ffordability. Village elders and other traditional adjudicators are 
based in the village. They speak the same language and are known to the people of the 
community. In the formal system, the crime has to be reported to the police and then taken 
to the courts. A whole set of procedures must be adhered to before justice can be achieved. 
Once one gets to the courts, they incur legal fees at the filing stage and even in paying 
advocates' fees. Traditional systems are more prompt and the parties do not incur any 
costs. This falls squarely within the threads of accessing justice by ensuring " ... access to 
95 Wachira G, 'Vindicating Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights in Kenya', 2008. 
96 P. Kameri -Mbote and Aketch M, "Justice Sector and the Rule of Law," (Open Society Foundations, 2011), 174. 
97 Section 2, Magistrate Courts Act (1967). 
98 https://www.academia.edu/4061034/ Informal Traditional Justice System on 10 December 2015. 
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justice for all persons and, if any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not 
impede access to justice. "99 
b) Flexibility. Traditional systems change with time to accommodate changing 
circumstances. The traditional adjudicators can change the laws without procedural 
technicality to adapt to different contexts. The formal system is rigid in nature as it 
operates within a set of rules. To change these rules, or to operate outside the ambit of 
these rules requires either a judicial review or a legislative remedy. 
c) Legitimacy. Traditional adjudicators possess an understanding of the daily on goings of 
their community. This enables them to become familiar with the historical, social and 
political background of disputes 100• This provides a more holistic approach to disputes. 
The court system requires judges and magistrates to be independent actors in a matter. 
This means that matters are adjudicated upon in a vacuum. 
d) They aim at social cohesion and reconciliation 101. Traditional justice systems succeed 
because social harmony is valued in the community. They are effective because they can 
deal with minor cases on a daily basis to ensure that people can continue living in the same 
community. The courts, due to their emphasis on retributive justice, have no inkling 
toward social cohesion and reconciliation. 
e) They cater to conflict and post-conflict situations·102. Traditional justice systems can be 
operate even in times of conflict and are used to restore peace after the conflict. Formal 
systems are crippled during conflicts and can only operate after the fact. An example is 
the system in Kipkeleon Constituency which was one of the areas that was worst hit by 
the post-election violence in 2007/8. A justice system was activated in 2008 to respond to 
the community needs and frustrations of reconstruction, reconciliation and restitution 103 • 
99 Article 48, Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
100 https://www.academia.edu/4061034/ Informal Traditional Justice System on 4 January 2016. 
101 Tiemessen E, "After Arusha : Gacaca justice in post-genocide Rwanda. African Studies Quarterly (2004) from 
http://www.africa .ufl.edu/asg/v8/v8i1a4.pdf on 6 January 2016. 
102 Dinnen S, 'Traditional' Justice Systems in the Pacific, Indonesia and Timor-Leste' 2009 . 




There are other attributes of TDRMs that make them more prevalent in the community. They 
include: the processes are participatory 104, the trials are done in public for a 105, and they involve 
voluntary processes 106 . It is clear that people at the grassroots level would prefer traditional 
mechanisms as they are simple and they cater to their immediate needs, not just as individuals, but 
to the community as a whole. It is for this reason that TDRMs were limited to specific matters of 
land, intestacy and marriage. 
4.2 Negative Attributes and the Challenges they present 
Like any other system, traditional justice systems are not perfect. Their weaknesses include -: 
a) Unequal power relations with a disregard for international human rights standards107. 
Traditional justice systems create power hierarchies at the expense of other groups. Most 
traditional systems in Kenya are patriarchal in nature 108 • This is because most councils of 
elders comprise of men; the Njuri Nceke of the Meru and the Kokwo of the Pokot. . Women 
and children are put in a lower position and they are forced to accept the status quo. In this 
regard, formal systems are better as they have to conform to the international standards of 
equality 109, usually along the lines of sex and age 110• 
b) Lack of enforcement machinery111 . Traditional systems have weak enforcement 
mechanisms. They rely on social pressure to implement compliance. 
c) Lack of competence of the traditional judges. In most cases, there is a lack of adequate 
training and supervision of leaders/officials adjudication in the traditional systems 112 • This 
may lead to conflict with the formal system. However, this presents an opportunity for the 
104 https://www.academia.edu/4061034/ Informal Traditional Justice System on 15 December 2015. 
105 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr old/indigenous/country reports/Country reports Kenya.pdf on 17 October 2015. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Rwiza R, "Ethics of Human Rights: The African Contribution", 2010. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Article 27, Constitution of Kenya (2010) . 
110 Article 27(4) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
111 https://www.academia.edu/4061034/ Informal Traditional Justice System. 
112 Tobiko K CBS, SC DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, KENYA, "The Relationship between Formal Rule of Law 








State to determine the boundaries within which the traditional judges can be trained to 
ensure conformity with the system. 
d) Unwritten law and lack of record~.I 13. Customary law operates under the ambit of tradition. 
In Kenya, the elders in a community are considered to be the stakeholders of the traditions 
of a community. These are the traditions that are passed on from one generation to the 
next 114 • Although the lack ofwritten records makes it difficult to understand and monitor 
the dynamics of the individual traditions, there is also a fortunate vacuum. The Jack of 
precedent enables new laws to be adopted easily by the community. 
These negative attributes threaten the integrity of a changing society. One where TDRMs are 
different from the formal systems which recognize the rights of women as being part of human 
rights. The lack of competence among the traditional adjudicators may result in similar legal 
changes going unaddressed at the grassroots level. The lack ofwritten records of reference material 
make it impossible to monitor the way TDRMs operate. Traditional justice systems in Kenya can 
be perfectly suited to adjudicating criminal matters only if they are tweaked in a way that will 
acknowledge the legal responsibilities placed upon the State by its citizens and the international 
community. 








CHAPTER 5: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OTHER TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS 
AGAINST THOSE USED IN KENYA 
Kenya is a state comprised of forty two tribes 11 5. This means that, there are forty two different 
cultures, each with a unique justice system that is observed. The common factor being, that the 
tribes use councils of elders in order to establish order and to punish perpetrators. These elders are 
deemed to be the stakeholders of the tribe. 
Ethnic diversity has been a challenge in many countries and governments have addressed this 
challenge in different ways. In Rwanda, there erupted the Gacaca system following the genocide 
that resulted in the killing of many Hutus and the Tutsis116 . Theirs was an attempt to restore peace 
and unity among their people. In Pakistan, the traditional system has existed for decades. In this 
chapter, the suitability of TDRMs in adjudicating criminal matters in Kenya will be illustrated 
against the situation in other countries. 
5.1 The Ethnic Situation in Kenya 
In order to create a comparative analysis, it is necessary to get a glimpse of the ethnic situation in 
Kenya. The justice systems that will be examined are those of the Kamba and the Kikuyu. These 
two communities illustrate the existence of traditional justice systems as well as the similarities 
afforded by these systems. 
a) The Kamba Justice System 
The Kamba justice system grounded on the social ties one has with the community. Thus, social 
practices inform individual behaviour as relationships had to be maintained as they formed the 
foundation of the community 117• 
115 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr old/indigenous/country reports/Country reports Kenya. pdf on 7 October 2015. 
116 http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/15/gacaca-courts-and-restorative-justice-in-rwanda/ on 3 November 2015. 






The dispute resolution process among the Akamba is hierarchical. Offences committed within the 
family are heard and determined by the family head. However, the family head could seek 
assistance from the clan elders 118 • Similarly, if the offender and the victim belonged to the same 
clan, the council of elders in that clan would adjudicate the matter. The perpetrator and the victim 
would have a representative to lay the facts before the elders. If the matter was between different 
clans, elders from the different clans would come together after which, spokespersons to represent 
each clan would then be selected to facilitate the hearing of evidence from both sides 119 . There 
would be different types of punishments awarded. Compensation was mandatory in almost all 
cases, for example the Kamba in Kitui on assault leading to damage to; one finger: one cow; one 
hand: one cow and one bull; one ear: one cow and one bull; one eye: one cow and one bull one 
leg: one cow and one bull 120 
b) The Kikuyu Justice System 
There is an established council of elders referred to as kiama kia mbariw. The council acts as an 
overseer and a judicial body. It is comprised of the male heads of the extended families . The 
principle ofnemo udex in causa sua is applied as an elder is required to recuse himself from sitting 
for a case in which he has an interest 122• 
The system is more restorative than retributive as seen in practice. The fine for the murder of a 
male was one hundred goats and sheep payable to the deceased's family. For female, the fine was 
30 goats and sheep payable to the deceased's family. The fine for breaking another person's leg 
was 50 goats 123 . From this, it can be argued that the system is very patriarchal. Once a case is 
118 The clan elders' court was comprised of family heads from the families making up the clan. 
119 Kinyanjui S. 'Restorative Justice in Traditional Pre-Coloniai"Criminal Justice Systems" in Kenya' from 
http://lawschool.unm.edu/tlj/volumes/voi10/Kinyanjui.pdf on 11 August 2015. 
120 Penwill D.J, "Kamba Customary Law; Notes taken in the Machakos District of Kenya Colony 85" (1951) . 
121 The term kiama is translated to mean "council." Kiama wa mbari then means clan council (author's own 
translation. 
122 Kinyanjui S. 'Restorative Justice in Traditional Pre-Coloniai"Criminal Justice Systems" in Kenya' from 
http://lawschool.unm.edu/tli/volumes/voi10/Kinyanjui.pdf on 11 August 2015 . 







presented, the elders would listen to the facts and give a decision. Once the decision is given, the 
offender is required to compensate the victim. Compensation is symbolic for taking responsibility 
for the crime 124 • 
5.2. The Case of Rwanda 
In 1994, there Genocide erupted in Rwanda. Between April and July of the same year between 
800,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in Rwanda 125 . The killings were 
organized by the Government and executed by combatants; the military, armed militia groups and 
ordinary men and women who often killed their own relatives, friends and neighbours 126 • At least 
250,000 women were victims of sexual violence. Many of the women were subsequently killed 
and 70% of the survivors were infected with HIV 127. In an effort to restore justice in the country, 
the Gacaca courts were established. For the purpose of this paper, the structure and the 
effectiveness ofthese courts will be evaluated. 
After the Genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established to fill 
the justice deficit created by absent of the Rwandan justice system 128 • However, due to its 
shortcomings, the Rwandan government proposed the ancient traditional method of dispute 
resolution known as Gacaca. The main objective of the system was reconciliation through 
restoration of harmony and social order by punishing, shaming and requiring reparations from the 
offenders 129 • 
124 Tribal Law Journal Vol. 10 
125 http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/15/gacaca-courts-and-restorative-justice-in-rwanda/ on 16 November 2015. 
126 Clark P and Kaufman Z, "After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in 
Rwanda and Beyond", London, Hurst eds. {2008). 
127 Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. Rene Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission of Human Rights from http://www.wfrt.org/humanrts/commission/countrv51/7.htm 127 -147 on 10 
December 2015. 
128 Tiemessen E, After Arusha: Gacaca justice in post-genocide Rwanda. African Studies Quarterly {2004) from 








The Gacaca courts were established to achieve a restorative and retributive justice approach in 
order to needs of the victims and the perpetrators. Established in 2001, the courts are headed by 
the Inyangamugaya - "people of integrity"- who were are suggested and elected by the local 
communityl 30 . Initially, the courts were able to try cases of homicide, theft and the destruction of 
goods and properties. They could award punishments i.e. community work to 30 years 
imprisonment 131 • Although they sought to promote justice, the Jack of impartiality in the courts 
was critiqued 132 • 
a) The courts 
The Gacaca System structurally is divided into administrative cell courts [local courts], sector 
courts and appellate courts133 . Each Gacaca court is composed of seven judges appointed by the 
community 134 . The judges undergo a training lasting between one to two weeks on the types of 
crimes and how to conduct trial proceedings . 
b) The parties 
The accused, dressed in pink prison attire, sit in the midd Je of community which they offended or 
victimized. There are no legal advisors; the community acts as plaintiff, legal advisors, juries and 
witnesses 135 . The community is tasked with giving testimonies ; questioning and/ or cross 
examining the defendants. The community is also responsible for declaring the form of 
punishment for the accused. Order is observed in the courts by the presence of armed guards 136 • 
13° Clark P, "The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda. Justice without Lawyers", 
Cambridge University Press (2010), 167. 
131 Kirkby C, "Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: A Preliminary Critique", Journal of African Law (2006), 101. 
132 Burnet J, "The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda", Genocide Studies and 
Prevention, 2008, 176. 
133 http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/gacaca-justice-system-rwanda-guest-for-justice-
in-the-post#.VRzWL yUclc on 25 July 2015. 
134 Carter E, "Justice and reconciliation on trial : Gacaca proceedings in Rwanda", New England Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2008) from http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/nejicl/voi14/Carter Final l.pdf 









c) The hearing 
The proceedings take three forms 137; information gathering, categorization, and judgment and 
sentencing. Information gathering begins at the cell level courts [local]. Categorization requires 
the judges to review the information and classify the crimes. This determines whether the crime 
will be tried by the Gacaca or the national courts. The judges preside over at this level to oversee 
community participation and witnesses, confession and regrets bargaining pleas, guide community 
to determine appropriate sentencing and encourage the community to have a say on how to initiate 
the reconciliation and reintegration process 138 . 
d) Expectations from the community 
The Gacaca courts are expected to create a trusting environment to prompt the perpetrators to 
confess truthfully 139 . This will initiate the forgiveness and reconciliation process. The courts are 
also tasked with ensuring the protection of witnesses from the community members 140 • 
e) Success 
The Gacaca system empowered women to engage in trials and reconciliation processes. Another 
aspect of success is the ability to try tens of thousands of cases in a shorter time than the ICTR 
would have been able to judicially prosecute 141 . 
f) Critiques 
There have been a number of critiques against the system. They include 142:-
• That the system lacks qualified judge and mechanisms to measure justice dispensation. 
Following the Gacaca process, the suspects "are taken to the villages where they allegedly 
137 http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/gacaca-justice-system-rwanda-quest-for-justice-
in-the-post#.VRzWL yUclc on 23 June 2015. 
138 Penal Reform International, "Eight years on: A record of Gacaca monitoring in Rwanda", (2010) on 15 June, 2015 
from http://www.penalreform.org/files/WEB%20english%20gacaca%20rwanda-S.pdf. 
139 http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOid= ... on 28 June 2015. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Tiemessen E, "After Arusha: Gacaca justice in post-genocide Rwanda", African Studies Quarterly (2004) from 







committed their crimes and confronted directly by their accusers. The trials are not 
overseen by legally qualified judges but local people respected for their integrity" 143 ; 
• That the Gacaca courts lack resources to deal with psychological and traumatic 
consequences; 
g) International assistance 
The international community; Human Rights Watch, Avocets Sans Frontiers (Lawyers without 
Borders), Reseaus de Citoyens (Citizens' Network, or RCN), and Penal Reform International, have 
assisted the system by providing legal material supplies 144 and innovative ways for investigating 
and prosecuting cases. For example, Reseaus de Citoyens on the other hand provided legal 
infrastructure specifically in training courts clerks, magistrates and prosecutors in the Gacaca 
system145 . 
The Gacaca system have brought justice to the Rwandan community. They have also bridged 
the ethnic divides among Rwandans through community participation in the trial proceedings. In 
comparison to Kenya, the Gacaca system has a more formal structure that envisages that of actual 
courts. Also, there is actual exposure of the judges to legal materials and processes. 
143 http://news.bbc.co.uk./1/hi/world/africa/3246291.stm 
144 Chakaravarty A, "Gacaca courts in Rwanda: Explaining divisions within the human rights community", Yale Journal 
of International Affairs (2011) from http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/061211chakravarty ... on 7 
July 2015. 
145 http://www. intern ati on a I peacea n dco nfli ct. org/p rofi I es/b logs/g aca ca- just i ce-syste m-rwan d a-guest -for-justice-






5.3 The Practice in Pakistan 
In Pakistan, there are two forms of ADR that are practiced; traditional ADR comprising of Jirga, 
Faislo and Panchayats, and public bodies such as Msalehat Committee or Small Claims and Minor 
Offences Courts Ordinance, 2002 (SCMOC0) 146 . 
a) Traditional ADR 
The Jirga system is used in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, the 
Panchayats in Punjab and, the Fasilo in Sindh147 . Under the Faislo, there are categories of 
crimes 148 : 
Table 1. Different Categories ofDisputes in Pakistan 
Nature of dispute Penalties & Punishments 
Dispute on demarcation of Agriculture Land Resolved In accordance with the revenue 
record and testimony ofthe witnesses on site. 
Dispute regarding distribution ofwater Resolved as per due appropriation of water 
share in irrigation record and severity of the 
matter. 
Neighbourhood disputes Amicably resolved with the consent and 
representation of both parties. 
146 Evaluation report on the Study of Informal Justice Systems in Pakistan from 
http://www.sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/Misc/Report%201nformai%20Justice%20System%20in%20Pakistan.pdf on 3 
November 2015. 
147https://www .goog I e.com /uri ?sa =t&rct= j&q=& es rc=s&source=web&c d = 7 & ca d=rj a& u act=8& ve d=OCEU QFjAG & u r 
l=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sja.gos.pk%2FPublicaiton%2FMisc%2FReport%25201nformai%2520Justice%2520System% 
2520in%2520Pakistan .pdf&ei=XXYjVefsGMjraMPRgcgl&usg=AFQjCNEb5t2wbjqV5pJbBKKUqcYjOOZ6zA&bvm=bv.89 
947451,d.d2s on 3 November 2015. 







Theft of goat, buffalo, standing/stored crops 
Injuries, attempt to Murder & murder 
Kidnapping 
Resolved amicably - parties usually re-join 
each other, in case of dissolution of marriage, 
maintenance is fixed and husband is liable to 
pay to the wife and children. 
Resolved amicably- the accused or his family 
members resolve or pay compensation in case 
the property has been disposed of. 
Compensation is paid to the injured and the 
legal heirs of the deceased. In case of murder 
of a woman compensation amount is double to 
that ofthe murder of a man. In cases of murder 
usually an amount Rs.400, 000/- is paid for the 
murder of a man whereas in case of a woman 
compensation would be Rs. 800,000/-. This 
practice vary from tribe to tribe, however 
female is treated differently from a man. 
Normally women are victim of this offence. 
During Faislo it is ensured that the woman is 
taken back and handed over to the family 
members ofthe victim. 
There is another category of crimes known as Karo-kari 149 • These are honour killings such as 
teenage girls who were buried alive after refusing arranged marriages . These killings are enjoy 
high level of support from the Pakistani rural society150. 
149 Evaluation report on the Study of Informal Justice Systems in Pakistan from 












b) Who/how to bring complaints 
In Pakistan, both parties approach the Sardar/Notable to resolve their dispute 151 • Sometimes, in 
Sindh, the courts also refer the parties to the Notables for amicable settlement of the dispute. For 
example, dispute between two tribes are also referred by a police officer to Sardars of third tribe 152 • 
A District Police Officer, Khairpur 153 informed that a dispute between two tribes involving murder 
of 17 persons was referred to a Sardar which was resolved in one day. The Sardars took about 8 
hours to bring the parties to agree 154 • 
c) Hearings 
Parties are given a fair hearing. They are allowed to bring two Musheers ; advisors who participates 
in the hearing and represent one of the parties to the dispute 155 . They also facilitate decision makers 
in resolving the dispute. The Musheers act as the clerks as they record the incident from the parties. 
The perpetrators and victims participate fully as there is no monetary involvement as is the contrary 
in the courts 156 . 
d) Role ofwitness(es) 
The Sardar calls and asks people to state the facts on oath 157 • Sometimes witnesses or the parties 
are asked to take special oath on the Holy Quran. In Sindh, it is known as Sakh and in NWFP 
151 Evaluation report on the Study of Informal Justice Systems in Pakistan from 
http://www.sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/Misc/Report%201nformai%20Justice%20System%20in%20Pakistan.pdf on 3 




947451,d.d2s on 3 November 2015 . 
153 Muhammad Peer Shah, District Police Officer, Khairpur from the 'Evaluation report on the Study of Informal 
Justice Systems in Pakistan' . 
154 Ibid. 
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known as Qassam 158. The process is formalized as decisions are based on the evidence and facts 
disclosed. 
e) Decision-making, both in terms of process and identity of decision-makers 
The system is similar to an arbitration. The parties to the dispute choose decision-makers contrary 
to the courts. Unlike the courts, there is no appellate authority and the process is not 159 . 
f) Enforcement of decisions; monitoring; recourse 
The parties must consent to the settlement ofthe dispute. Once the decision is given, the parties 
must put their signature in acknowledgement. This is what the parties will act on 160 • 
g) Interaction and Relationship between Formal and Informal Justice Systems and Impact. 
There have been efforts by the Government of Pakistan to integrate and develop relationship 
between the formal and informal justice systems 161 • The Local Government Ordinance of2001 
provides a basic framework for resolution of disputes. This is done through Musalihat Anjuman 
(MA). The MA consists of selected persons from the community through Insaf Committees (ICs) 
at union council level 162 . The criteria being persons who have integrity, good judgment and 
command respect. The courts can refer cases to MA where proceedings are pending 163 • Earlier 
committees redressed petty issues but the police and courts have departed and referred cases of 
criminal nature as witnesses and perpetrators are more responsive to MA 164 • 
Compared to Kenya, the traditional systems of Pakistan is similar in that there are more than two 
existing traditional justice systems. However, there has been more effort by the Pakistani 
government in developing a relationship between the formal and traditional systems. These two 
systems clearly show that TDRMs can be effectively used in adjudicating criminal matters. 





163 Section 104, Local Government Ordinance of 2001. 









CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE USE OF TDRMs 
IN KENYA 
6.1 Conclusion 
It is clear that customary law has formed a big part of the history of Kenya. This resulted in 
traditional justice systems tailored to meet the needs of the different communities that exist. 
However, the introduction of the formal legal system threatened these traditional systems, but with 
the passage oftime, it is clear that these traditional systems are here to stay. 
Most of these traditional systems operate as though the formal legal system does not exist because 
this is what has been the practice. The move to using courts can only be realized ifthe courts are 
located in all parts of Kenya. However, this may not always guarantee that people will use them. 
The man in the village will always opt for the system that is closer to home, the system that he 
understands and one that understands him in return 165. For this reason, the State equip these 
traditional systems with the necessary tools to effectuate criminal justice. 
6.2 Recommendations 
The current criminal justice system in Kenya has embraced the two variants ofthe system; formal 
and informal. Against the background of access to justice, a victim of a crime can choose the 
system in which they can best receive recourse. The courts have accepted the use of traditional 
systems in certain cases. The State can equip these traditional systems in two ways; legislative and 
non-legislative action. 






a) Legislative action 
The criminal justice system of Kenya operates within a legal framework entrenched in the 
Constitution 166, as well as statute; the Criminal Procedure Code 167, the Penal Code 168 and the 
Evidence Act. These laws act as complementary tools of justice, not only in the substantive, but 
also in the procedural. The question then becomes whether the State should legislate on traditional 
justice systems. 
In reality, traditional systems operate in a vacuum of unwritten laws and unrecorded proceedings. 
Introducing legislation may pave way for legally recognized rules and a system of monitoring that 
emanates from written records. On the other hand, legislating on these systems may take away 
from their informal nature and their flexibility to easily adapt to change in circumstance 169 . 
Legislation may also interfere with the language of the people as they would be expected to use 
the State's national and formal languages. 
Although written laws allow for better implementation and monitoring 170, they may not be prudent 
where the system has a close proximity to the ways of the people. This paper proposes that the 
State should not legislate on the procedure within which TDRMs operate. Ifthey must legislate, 
they can do so on the substantive; limited to the construction of the adjudicators to include the 
concept of equality, as well as prescribing different forms of punishment for different crimes. 
b) Non-legislative action 
Legal tools do not always have a legislative characteristic. Legal tools and mechanisms can borrow 
from the legislative and be tailored to the nature of a system. From the evaluation of the Gacaca 
166 Constitution of Kenya {2010). 
167 Cap 75 
168 Cap 63 . 
169 Bello E and Ajibola B, 'Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim 0/awale Elias', Vol. II, Martin us Nijhoff Publishers and 







system and traditional mechanisms used in Pakistan, there are a number of non-legislative tools 
that can be adopted by the State. They Include -: 
1. The development and design of training modules and material for traditional 
"judges" involved in resolving disputes under informal justice system 171 • 
There is a pressing need to develop and design a comprehensive training module and readily avail 
legal materials on substantive and procedural matters in the layman's language. This will help to 
eliminate repugnancy; bias, prejudice and violation of basic human rights. This was the case under 
the Gacaca system as explained earlier 172 . The State engaged the judges in a two week training 
program to familiarize them with the laws they had to subscribe to. The international community 
even assisted the judges with legal materials and new adjudicative processes 173 . 
The State should engage all traditional adjudicators in basic and continuous training that will 
familiarize them with the law, and enable them to introduce new aspects of adjudication into their 
respective communities. This will assist both the State and the community. 
2. Formation of a coordination, evaluation and implementation committee at all 
levels174• 
There ought to be coordination, evaluation and implementation committees within both the formal 
and traditional criminal justice system. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission of 
Kenya is established to, inter alia, promote, good relations, harmony and peaceful co-existence 
between persons ofthe different ethnic and racial communities ofKenya 175 • 
171 http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/gacaca-justice-system-rwanda-guest-for-justice-
in-the-post#.VRzWL yUclc on 23 June 2015. 
172 /bid. 
173 Chakaravarty A, "Gacaca courts in Rwanda: Explaining divisions within the human rights community", Yale Journal 
of International Affairs (2011) from http://yalejournal.org/wp content/uploads/2011/01/061211chakravarty ... on 7 
July 2015. 
174 Evaluation report on the Study of Informal Justice Systems in Pakistan from 
http://www.sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/Misc/Report%201nformal%20Justice%20System%20in%20Pakistan.pdf on 3 
November 2015. 







In Rwanda, the Abunzi has 176 jurisdiction over criminal cases involving the removal or 
displacement of land terminals and plots; any form of devastation of crops by animals and 
destruction of crops when the value of crops ravaged or destroyed do not exceed three million 
Rwandan francs ; theft of crops when the value of crops does not exceed three million Rwandan 
francs and larceny (theft) when the value of the stolen object does not exceed three million 
Rwandan francs 177 • 
The interaction between the courts and traditional systems must be guided to allow for 
coordination. Once coordination is established, a system of monitoring can be implemented. 
3. Providing the traditional systems with a legal framework within which TDRMs can 
operate. 
The Government should create guidelines to which traditional systems must subscribe should they 
wish to be recognized by the state. This will slowly but eventually snuff out any practices that are 
repugnant to justice and morality. An example is adhering to principles of international standards. 
Existing legislation should be reviewed i.e. the Evidence Act 178 should review the rules of evidence 
or create a new chapter within which the rules of evidence can be appreciated at the community 
level. 
This will also enable all traditional adjudicators to be recognized by the State. An example of a 
guideline is requiring every traditional adjudicating body in a county to be recorded by the courts 
in that county. This will enable the State to know which areas rely more on traditional adjudicators 
so that they can be trained effectively. 
176 http://www.rwandapedia .rw/explore/abunzi on 14 December 2015. 
177 Ibid. 






4. Agreeing which system can adjudicate certain matters 179• 
In the states in which this had been effective; Rwanda and Zimbabwe, legislation has been passed. 
The Rwandan government created the Organic Law No. 31/2006. This law recognizes the role of 
Abunzi or local mediators in conflict resolution of disputes and crimes 180 . 
In Swaziland customary courts have jurisdiction both in criminal and civil matters over Swazi 
nationals residing within their jurisdictional areas 181 . However, at a practical level whether a 
criminal case is to be tried by a traditional or formal court is made at a police station 182 . 
From this, it is clear that the State has to take the first step in ensuring a proper complementary 
interaction between the two systems. First, it has to classify crimes in order for the systems to 
know which crimes they can adjudicate. Second, the State needs to understand the different kinds 
of traditional justice systems that exist in Kenya. Lastly, the State must find a way to engage the 
two systems. This will give rise to proper application oftraditional systems to criminal matters. 
The implementation of these recommendations will undoubtedly involve a measure of 
compromise. However, such compromise would be beneficial to all if a balance is to be struck 
between the use of traditional justice systems and the use of the courts in adjudicating criminal 
matters. 
5. Aligning the practice ofTDRMs with Constitutional provisions 
With the provision of equality in Article 27 of the Constitution, it is important for the traditional 
adjudicators, which comprise mostly of council of elders, to include women and the youth in 
179 Masuku T, "Women and Justice in Swaziland: Has the Promise of the Constitution been Fulfilled?" in in Women, 
Custom and Access to Justice, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Perspectives-Political Analyses and Commentary (2013). 
180 Mutisi M, "Local conflict resolution in Rwanda: The case of abunzi mediators", in M. Mutisi and K. Sansculotte-
Greenidge (Eds), Integrating Traditional and Modern Conflict Resolution : Experiences from selected cases in 
Eastern and the Horn of Africa, 41. 
181 Masuku T, "Women and Justice in Swaziland: Has the Promise of the Constitution been Fulfilled?" in in Women, 








leadership. This will cure the repugnant nature of patriarchy that is identified with traditional 
justice systems. It will also give more confidence to the people in the community as they can be 
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